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A series of issues and opportunities identified in past Forums 
led to the choice of topics for the Aspen Institute’s 35th annual 
Energy Policy Forum. An invited group of energy leaders and 
policy experts discussed “Changing Currents: Turbulence for the 
Electricity Industry?” from July 3-7 in Aspen.
As in previous years, the Forum relied on dialogue to explore 
commercial and public policy issues at the intersection of energy, 
the economy and the environment. Each half-day session started 
with short introductory presentations, and a spirited, off-the-record 
dialogue followed. 
Following the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in the previous 
Congress, the Forum discussed other options to mitigate climate 
change such as state and regional initiatives, enhanced energy 
RD&D, EPA regulation, clean electricity standards, and carbon 
taxes. Aging infrastructure, along with the possibility of rapid retire-
ment of older coal plants, led to discussions about the security, reli-
ability and adequacy of electricity infrastructure and the enhance-
ment and replacement of generation and transmission facilities.
The introduction of two mass-market electric vehicles in the past 
year gave greater immediacy to questions about electrification of the 
v
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transportation sector, and mandates and proposals to increase the 
use of renewable energy led to discussion of various policy changes 
to achieve this goal.
Following the crisis involving the reactors at Fukushima,  a ses-
sion on the future of nuclear power in the United States was added 
to the agenda. It included questions of safety, economics, policy 
incentives, and public support. China’s rapid electrification poses a 
host of questions for its own and global energy markets, and in the 
final session the group discussed what is happening there and what 
lessons it may offer for U.S. policies.
The dialogue was chaired by Phil Sharp, President of Resources 
for the Future and former Chair of the House of Representatives 
Energy and Power Subcommittee. His experience, broad perspec-
tive, and good humor gave him the ability to focus the discussion on 
key issues. The highly qualified session chairs and speakers provided 
a wealth of information and a variety of perspectives, and the diverse 
expertise of the well qualified participants added to the richness of 
the dialogue. 
The Institute acknowledges and thanks the following Forum 
sponsors for their financial support. Most have been participants 
and supporters for many years. Without their generosity and com-
mitment to our work, the Forum could not have taken place. 











Energy Institute, University  
   of Texas at Austin 
Hertz Equipment Rental
Duke Energy
Lighthouse Consulting  
   Group
Navigant Consulting
National Rural Electric 








On behalf of the Institute and the Forum participants, I also thank 
Gernot Wagner, who served as rapporteur. He identified important 
themes from a rich and varied discussion and prepared a vivid sum-
mary. Timothy Olson managed the administrative arrangements for 
the Forum, and I am grateful for his support. As many participants 
have noted, his thoroughness and dedication were responsible for a 
smoothly run meeting. Nikki DeVignes ably and cheerfully assisted 
in the advance arrangements.  
This report is issued under the auspices of the Aspen Institute, 
and the chairs, speakers, participants, and sponsors are not respon-
sible for its contents. Although it is an attempt to represent ideas 
and information presented during the Forum, all views expressed 
were not unanimous and participants were not asked to agree to the 
wording.
 John A. Riggs
 Senior Fellow
 Energy and Environment Program
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The question is never whether the United States has an energy 
policy. It has dozens. They come with various decision-makers at 
overlapping levels of authority, ample numbers of stakeholders, and 
generally lots of confusing and often contradictory signals.
Congress has been the locus of decision-making over the past half 
a decade, but by now most attention has shifted from legislation to 
regulation. The Environmental Protection Agency, in particular, has 
garnered significant attention—both positive and negative—with its 
long-delayed rulemaking in various areas. These rules cover every-
thing from tighter ozone standards, the transport rule involving 
local and regional air pollutants and their effects on neighboring 
states, as well as greenhouse gas regulation prompted by the 2007 
Supreme Court decision in EPA v. Massachusetts, which requires 
EPA to address global warming pollution. 
Often the only question is whether Congress will act to over-
turn or delay EPA’s regulatory efforts. That seems unlikely, given 
Congressional paralysis and threats of Presidential veto, but politi-
cal doubts remain nonetheless. The ongoing debt discussions, in 
particular, could add another level of uncertainty related to EPA’s 
authority.
v
Policy Uncertainty Meets  
Uncertain Politics Meets Often 
Painful Certainties 
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Five current major uncertainties and at least one recurring cer-
tainty—the important role of China—govern the world we live in.
First, where is consumer demand going? If electricity use does, in 
fact, decline as either bearish economists or bullish energy efficiency 
enthusiasts would prescribe, the energy landscape will be very differ-
ent than if demand were to increase in the decades to come.
One certainty here is that while U.S. demand may be stagnant, 
Chinese demand is clearly going up, with equally profound implica-
tions for everything from electric vehicles to global coal supplies and 
the price of solar technology.
Second, are new shale gas supplies here to stay? Citizen concerns 
over fracking may yet cause massive uncertainties in the supplies of 
shale gas, but they are not all that is at stake. How will coal supplies 
develop? How will renewables be affected? What new new technol-
ogy will eventually displace gas as the coal replacement of choice?
One certainty here is that China will play a large role in coal mar-
kets for the foreseeable future, driving up global coal prices even 
further relative to natural gas.
Third, where is U.S. climate and technology policy heading? 
Carbon pricing looms large, but it is unlikely to come on a federal, 
economy-wide level soon.
One certainty is that other countries, including China but espe-
cially Europe, are moving ahead of the United States, and may well 
gain competitive advantages that will be difficult to match later on.
Fourth, what has EPA wrought, and what does it have in store? 
Long-delayed old rules and new rules are on the horizon. But the 
when and how are still a big question. Moreover, will new rules 
be far-reaching enough to tilt the balance toward renewables on a 
national level, or will we continue to build coal and natural gas, just 
with a steeper price tag?
global energy Markets in a tiMe of PolitiCal Change  
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One certainty is that China is moving ahead with its own set of 
ambitious renewable targets. It will be building massive amounts of 
new coal plants, but it’s also bound to take a global leadership role 
in renewables.
Fifth, what does Fukushima mean for nuclear power, new and 
old? Reactions around the world have been markedly different. In 
Germany, nuclear energy will soon be a thing of the past. In the 
United States, new nuclear power seems to be as uncertain after 
Fukushima as it was before.
One certainty is that China is building more new nuclear plants 
than the United States has to date, and is bound to take a global 
leadership role here as well.
v
The subsequent sections will address these five uncertainties, the 
uncertain politics of it all, and the certainty of a rising China. Even 
there, though, uncertainties are all around us: Where will China’s 
rise lead—especially in a carbon-constrained world? That’s our first 
stop.
PoliCy unCertainty Meets unCertain PolitiCs Meets often Painful Certainties
3

5Alternative Approaches  
to Climate Change 
With the failure of comprehensive, national climate legislation, 
most of the policy and regulatory action has left the halls of Congress 
and instead found willing takers in federal agencies and states.
Over half of U.S. states have renewable portfolio standards, 
almost two-thirds have state climate action plans, over twenty have 
state-wide greenhouse gas emissions targets, and a full dozen have 
started or already completed adaptation planning efforts to be able 
to respond to the inevitable effects of climate change.
Moreover, states have taken on the task of creating comprehen-
sive cap-and-trade systems that the federal government has so far 
failed to do. California is leading the pack with its AB 32 legislation 
that will establish a comprehensive, state-wide cap-and-trade system 
by 2013. It is also part of the Western Climate Initiative, a coalition 
of seven states, which comprise almost 15% of U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions, and four Canadian provinces.
Other regional initiatives include the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative. It is currently under severe assault, not least because 
Governor Chris Christie has decided to pull New Jersey out of the 
initiative and repeal initiatives and legal challenges are under way in 
other states. Nevertheless, RGGI has generated over $800 million in 
Changing Currents: turbulenCe for the eleCtriCity industry?
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revenues from auctioning greenhouse gas emissions credits, and that 
despite a loose overall emissions cap resulting in very low allowance 
prices.
It is clear that a plethora of state laws will inhibit efficient regu-
lation of greenhouse gases in the United States, but failing federal 
action, state-level legislation and regional initiatives have the poten-
tial to make a significant difference in overall reductions. States 
together with EPA regulatory efforts could achieve as much as half 
the greenhouse gas emissions reductions federal legislation would 
have promised to do.
v
While climate policy driven by a cap or price on carbon is a key 
pillar of reducing emissions and jump-starting the green economy, 
support for clean energy innovation plays a similarly crucial role. It 
can lower the cost of achieving any particular emissions reduction 
target, and it can help make goals more ambitious by lowering cost 
barriers.
More fundamentally, we know we have two massive market fail-
ures: one is the negative environmental externality, which is best 
combated by capping greenhouse gas emissions or putting a price 
on them—cap-and-trade or a carbon tax. The second is a positive 
technological spillover externality. Inventors don’t consider the fact 
that they will eventually provide shoulders for others to stand on. 
That’s a social benefit to private innovation that’s not considered in 
individual decision-making.
It’s also where public support for clean energy innovation comes 
in. The need for subsidies for development and deployment is clear; 
the political will for it is much less so.
One political justification is international competitiveness. A key 
question there is whether we can have a robust energy innovation 
alternative aPProaChes to CliMate Change 
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system without a robust domestic manufacturing sector. The answer 
may well be no, if we believe that innovation tends to follow manu-
facturing. In that case, direct subsidies for targeted industries may 
play an important role.
We do already have some ready support in the form of research 
and development tax credits. The challenge is to make them perma-
nent, or at least extend them far enough into the future to create a 
predictable policy environment.
Another important dimension is direct government support 
for innovation. That includes basic research as much as targeted 
research for the development of clean technologies and, ultimately, 
their deployment. The Department of Energy is leading many 
of these initiatives, although it, too, lacks funds and often focus. 
Many initiatives are under increased pressure from Congress just 
as demand-driven greenhouse gas policies like cap-and-trade and 
a carbon tax are off the table for the time being. That, of course, 
doesn’t make supply-side policies less important.
To the contrary, the central policy and political question is in 
how far supply-side policies can substitute for a lack of demand-side 
options. Or more poignantly, how to jump-start a green economy 
and achieve emissions reduction goals now that comprehensive, 
federal cap-and-trade is dead for the foreseeable future?
v
Three possible alternatives to cap-and-trade are EPA regulation, 
Clean Electricity Standards, and a carbon tax.
EPA regulation is the most realistic of the three options, mainly 
because it requires no Congressional action and is already largely 
underway. It is also rather complex. For one, there is considerable 
concern around market-based approaches related to interstate and 
other rules. The more flexible the system, the trickier is EPA’s legal 
authority.
Changing Currents: turbulenCe for the eleCtriCity industry?
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There are also other, more fundamental challenges. The Clean Air 
Act, on which all present rules are based, states explicitly that anyone 
with annual emissions larger than 250 tons needs a permit. That 
threshold is sensible for sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides and other 
criteria air pollutants. It is not practical for carbon. EPA has recog-
nized this and passed the so-called “tailoring rule,” which sets the 
threshold at 100,000 tons. Critics, however, are challenging the legal 
grounds for the rule. If EPA is forced to follow the letter of the law, 
regulation would not just be impractical but also extremely costly to 
administer and comply with.
EPA has an obligation to implement the best system of emissions 
reductions, which may well be to let states take the lead in pursu-
ing cap-and-trade approaches in compliance with federal clean air 
statues. However, there are clear disadvantages to a state-by-state 
pollutant-by-pollutant approach, which would limit the reach of the 
program and also its cost-effectiveness.
v
Hence a lot of hope is still put into Congressional action. One 
possible approach could be a nation-wide Clean Electricity Standard 
that sets a maximum level of greenhouse gas emissions per megawatt 
hour of electricity produced. Such a standard would remove the 
necessity for state-level renewable portfolio standards, currently in 
place in over half of states. “Keep it simple” is generally one of the 
key design principles, given how important simplicity and predict-
ability are for those making investment decisions. Another key com-
ponent is price or cost certainty.
Ideally, such a standard would employ a technology-neutral met-
ric that is agnostic as to how companies ultimately comply. Another 
key characteristic is that CES credits ought to be tradable. That 
might open up the system to charges that it is really just a back-door 
cap-and-trade system, but it also makes it significantly more cost-
effective than a static approach. Trading makes compliance cheaper 
and also allows for a more ambitious target in the first place.
alternative aPProaChes to CliMate Change 
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A possible benchmark could be a system that starts with a target 
of 0.4 tons of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour of electricity pro-
duced in 2015, declining to perhaps 0.2 tons by 2035. This standard 
would bring about a significant change in the power sector. It could 
also be combined with a cap on the price of credits traded in the 
market. Higher prices would trigger the sale of further credits, with 
the money raised spent on clean energy research.
A smartly designed—yet still simple—CES might be a credible 
alternative to EPA regulation. It would likely be both cleaner and 
more cost effective, and it would avoid the risks of Congressional 
and legal challenges that EPA faces. It would, of course, face formi-
dable opposition to passage in the first place.
v
A more ambitious alternative to EPA and state-level action would 
be a carbon tax. The rationale for pricing carbon is simple and will 
surprise no one: carbon has a social cost; it ought to have a price. The 
policy: set such a price via a nation-wide, top-down carbon tax, and 
get out of the way.
The politics of such a venture are trickier. “T-a-x” is a four-letter 
word in Washington. That said, the political urgency is clear, and 
climate is only one reason. Another is to raise additional revenue and 
help achieve fundamental tax reform.
One could imagine taking all carbon tax revenue and devoting it 
to a trust fund whose sole purpose is to reduce corporate income and 
payroll taxes, while at the same time removing as many tax credits 
and other exemptions as possible.
Like a CES, an ideal tax would be uniform across fuels. The goal is 
not to pick winning technologies, the goal is to decrease carbon and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Almost every form of energy has some 
side effects that we may not like for one reason or another.
Why would this possibly work?
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It’s not cap-and-trade; it’s fundamental tax reform. The corporate 
income tax is the worst tax when it comes to international competi-
tion. However, it’s impossible to imagine corporate tax reform with-
out raising revenue somewhere else. A carbon tax could fill that hole.
Moreover, we now have a test case in British Columbia. The 
province has a carbon tax, and the government is sending a monthly 
check to households, refunding revenues in a lump-sum fashion. In 
many ways, it is the ideal economic design, and we should pay close 
attention to how the politics play out.
v
Regardless of whether the federal policy outcome will look more 
like a Clean Electricity Standard, a carbon tax, or perhaps even cap-
and-trade, the reasoning behind federal action is clear. The more we 
let state policies get ingrained, the longer they will stay in place. We 
don’t need fifty different climate policies. 
11
Electricity is one of the essential services driving economic growth 
and human progress. It is also often taken for granted.
That puts electric utilities and especially regulators and policy-
makers in a difficult position, given that electricity also shares sev-
eral other, competing characteristics: it must meet customers’ (and 
the economy’s) demand for reliability, it’s unbelievably regional and 
local, it’s very capital intensive and thus hard to change rapidly, and 
it has a large environmental footprint.  
All of these characteristics and competing priorities are impor-
tant and present real trade-offs for regulators and policy-makers. 
Electricity policy, to no small extent, is often muddled precisely 
because it’s being pulled in many different directions.
One priority that often gets short shrift, at least from the gen-
eral public, is reliability. It is more often than not simply taken for 
granted, with few wanting to pay extra for more reliable service.
A key question in this context is the trade-off between conven-
tional fuels—chiefly coal, natural gas, and nuclear—and newer, 
lower-carbon (or non-nuclear) alternatives. But before we look at 
both, let’s look at an area that’s all too often dismissed but is pos-
Infrastructure Reliability  
and Adequacy
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sibly even more central than power generation: transmission and 
distribution of electricity.
v
The grid is vulnerable to crippling disruptions that can cause 
real economic and human havoc. FERC itself—its main building in 
Washington, DC—was without power for 3 days not too long ago. 
One would think that this would have lead to an investigation of 
sorts looking into grid stability. Alas, no such luck.
Investment in grid technology is absolutely crucial. However, 
transmission investment is lagging electricity demand increases, and 
the effects are being felt. Half a million Americans experience power 
outages of two hours and more per year, largely due to interrup-
tions in the transmission and distribution grid. Any interruption, of 
course, comes with enormous costs.
An apt comparison here is to the interstate highway system. It was 
clear from the beginning that the highway system was crucial for the 
economy and national security, and that’s how it was sold: as part of 
an integrated plan that included national security as a crucial justifi-
cation. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 is popularly known as 
the “National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956,” and for 
good reason. Grid modernization should be presented in the same 
way: elevated to national security level.
In this context, the gaps in federal regulatory authority are deeply 
concerning. Transmission, in many ways, is a national and regional 
issue, whereas transmission siting policy is often done on the state 
and local level. States also have authority over pricing, with regula-
tors in one state often deciding whether a utility can charge custom-
ers within a state for transmission elsewhere.
A possible sleeper issue is local distribution and its relationship 
to transmission. One of the key questions is whether it is possible to 
address the challenges inherent in traditional investor-owned utility 
models, where utilities invest in generation but little in transmission 
and distribution. Once again, it may well be necessary to have a 
program led by the federal government, perhaps linked to national 
security.
But we ought to plan for all eventualities. Right now we are iden-
tifying massive needs for new transmission investment. Will that be 
truly necessary as the world moves toward a distributed model of 
electricity generation? Would we be putting too many assets into 
something that’s inflexible and not reversible? Uncertainty is a real 
caveat here, too.
v
Fossil fuels—in particular coal and natural gas—play a key role 
whenever discussion moves to stable supplies. (Nuclear energy is 
similarly important. More on that in a later section.) Coal has clear 
environmental problems, and EPA regulates it for good reason. Still, 
there are considerable challenges to replacing coal.
Coal currently provides the largest single share of stable, baseload 
electricity, and this will be the case for some time to come. But the 
electric utility industry is clearly in an era of transformation—chief-
ly, of course, a transformation away from traditional coal to cleaner 
forms of generation.
For utilities that rely largely on coal, one key issue with com-
ing environmental regulations is the higher cost associated with 
an earlier compliance deadline. Regulators must weigh these costs 
against the public health impacts of less stringent deadlines. Another 
issue is the interaction between plant location decisions and the 
transmission grid. It’s important to look at specific areas within 
the grid to see why units are located where they are located. That 
often contradicts other rational ways of looking at plant decisions, 
including decisions on plant closures to comply with environmental 
regulations. For example, minimizing local environmental impacts 
would entail building plants away from population centers, while 
minimizing transmission losses would call for the opposite.
13
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Another challenge to coal comes from natural gas. It’s now 
viewed as a safer bet than building new coal plants, for several rea-
sons. For one, gas is perceived to be better environmentally than 
coal. Domestic supplies are plentiful. Moreover, there is consider-
able excess capacity that will allow for a relatively cheap expansion 
from current levels. Lastly, it is essential to have flexible backup 
technologies for many renewable energy sources, and natural gas 
plants are more flexible than coal.
It is true that the electricity sector is dominated by long-lived 
assets and the so-called “lock-in” effect, but large-scale fuel switch-
ing has happened before. The shift from coal to gas could be a simi-
larly far-reaching switch.
Consistently low natural gas prices, of course, will come with 
their own challenges. For once, gas has the potential to be a cleaner-
burning fuel. However, it still has local environmental and green-
house gas impacts and will thus also be impacted by climate policy 
down the line.
Another big challenge comes from the ruckus caused over the 
environmental impact of fracking technologies. Whether objectively 
safe or not, significant disruptions and associated price volatility 
could occur because of drilling moratoriums and other regulatory 
interventions.
v
The fact that the electricity industry is in upheaval is evident by 
the plethora of options suddenly available. The latest capacity auc-
tion in the PJM region, centered on Pennsylvania, New Jersey and 
Maryland, included 1 gigawatt of energy efficiency being offered. 
That kind of offer would have been unthinkable only a few years 
ago, yet in this case it even cleared the auction—i.e. it underbid 
other forms of electricity supply to truly show that “negawatts” can 
be the cheapest electricity source.
Similarly dramatic changes are happening on the demand side 
with increasing frequency. Zero-emissions buildings are no longer 
a pipe dream. They are being built at increasing rates. It will take 
decades to change the U.S. housing stock, but we can clearly no lon-
ger take it as a given that every building will be an electricity user. 
Many will be independent. Many may, in part, turn into electricity 
suppliers.
That has enormous implications for traditional utilities as well as 
for transmission, distribution, and especially also electricity regula-
tors. The latter may no longer be faced with dozens of utilities but 
possibly millions of possible suppliers. One of deepest challenges is 
to restructure regulatory systems to service net-zero buildings. 
15
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Electric vehicles are bound to change the way we move. They 
could also have some surprising impacts on how we generate, dis-
tribute, and use electricity more broadly.
EVs aren’t exactly new. A full third of cars on the road in 1912 
were powered by electricity, but EVs lost out to the internal com-
bustion engine for several reasons—chiefly that of reach. A century 
later, we have a chance to approximate the market share EVs held 
back then. Battery technologies have largely caught up with our 
increasingly mobile lifestyle and most uses. That doesn’t yet mean 
that a switch to EVs will happen automatically or quickly, but EVs 
clearly have all the markers of a “disruptive technology,” challenging 
beliefs about transportation we have held for generations.
It’s clear that EVs are cheaper to operate than cars using internal 
combustion engines. A typical user spending $2,000 a year on gas 
would incur electricity costs of no more than $500 per year, and that 
assumes charging the vehicle exclusively during peak demand times. 
With off-peak charging, assuming differentiated rates are available, 
costs could drop to as low as $250 per year.
The EV itself will be more expensive than cars powered by inter-
nal combustion engines, but costs are coming down fast and will 
soon approach a point where combined capital and usage costs are 
comparable. Costs for energy storage technologies have decreased 
Changing Currents: turbulenCe for the eleCtriCity industry?
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dramatically over the years and are projected to come down sub-
stantially for at least the next five years. Some projections don’t see 
gains beyond 2020, but there is always room for surprises.
Even now, EVs pay for themselves in under 10 years, and the 
payback period is projected to decrease to 5 years within the decade. 
This reflects large jumps in battery technology. Even 5 years, though, 
is long relative to how average consumers make their purchasing 
decisions. Consumers typically expect 3-year payback periods for 
investments in efficiency.
None of this yet reflects additional monetary incentives. Tax 
credits and other incentives currently in place decrease the payback 
period now from just under 10 to under 5 years.
A key component in this equation will be carbon pricing. With 
federal gas taxes at 18.4 cents per gallon and slated to decline to 
4.3 cents per gallon at the end of September, EVs, of course, have a 
much harder time competing than at prices that would reflect the 
true cost of a gallon of gasoline. 
v
But regardless of payback periods, learning curves, and other price 
projections, it’s clear that the EV is here and seems to be here to stay.
One indication is demand, which is clearly there. General Electric 
alone has ordered 25,000 EVs, a number far in excess of current 
supply. This marks a clear inversion of the 1990s, when supply was 
there, demand wasn’t.
The shift to EVs may also be coming hand-in-hand with other 
shifts in car ownership such as vehicle and fleet sharing. For one, 
rental companies with their rapid fleet turnover are a prime target. 
Most buy and turn over cars every year. Hertz alone buys $5 billion 
worth of cars per year. Other fleet companies such as FedEx and UPS, 
by contrast, turn over their truck fleet on average every 20 to 25 years. 
It was no accident that the Prius got its start with Hertz, where it was 
19
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tested before it went to the public market. Larger-scale shifts in car 
ownership models may well aid the transition to EVs and could, by 
themselves, represent major changes to transport systems.
v
It’s still important, though, to look at the broader policy context. 
If the primary objective is reducing oil consumption then there are 
several other technologies that could complement or possibly even 
substitute for EVs. Biofuels for traditional internal combustion 
engines, natural gas vehicles, or fuel efficiency efforts could all fall 
into that category. It’s perhaps difficult to see how one technology—
EVs—can displace all others. Not all will be winners, but perhaps it 
will be more than one.
EVs themselves also harbor various profound policy implica-
tions. One question is around gas tax revenue. It’s true that part of 
the reason for the gas tax is to get people to drive less and drive more 
fuel-efficient cars. On the other hand, federal and state transporta-
tion funding to a large extent depends on the gas tax. Granted, taxes 
are already too low to pay the full bill, but that shortfall is small 
compared to what we could experience if we saw a large-scale shift 
to EVs and no fundamental policy shift from taxing gallons to miles 
driven. Drivers are, of course, already paying a miles-per-gallon fee, 
just that it comes via the gas tax, and that it is variable. We need to 
shift that tax to a fixed amount per mile, or perhaps base it on the 
weight of vehicles to create the right incentives. 
A second policy question relates to carbon pricing, which is espe-
cially important right now for California. Specifically, who will end 
up getting credits under its cap-and-trade system for investment in 
EVs and EV infrastructure? Will it be utilities, car manufacturers, 
service providers, or ultimately consumers? The answer right now is 
that consumers get credit in the sense that they are saving money on 
their gas bills. Who else could or should get credit, or does this sim-
ply point to the limitations of cap-and-trade to aid systemic changes 
like a wholesale shift to EVs?
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Subsidies present another important policy question. Is it feasible 
for us as a nation to expect that we can afford a $7,500 tax credit for 
EVs at scale? Many early adapters, one would think, would buy EVs 
with or without a tax credit. In that sense, it may even be possible to 
wait with the credit. On the other hand, a sizeable tax credit should 
motivate many to purchase EVs. That, of course, comes with a price 
tag for the government. How sustainable will that price tag be, and 
what will happen once it has to be phased out?
Lastly, there are serious policy issues related to the supply chain of 
EVs. Battery technology, in particular, is an area where early market 
leadership could help cement a longer-term position. Not surprising-
ly, Chinese manufacturers are taking a large lead in this area. Beijing’s 
support for this industry comes with costs, but there are clear ben-
efits that only China seems to be able to tap into at the moment. A 
nascent industry like car battery technology may well call for some 
kind of industrial policy that would enable an entire country to take 
a leading role in global manufacturing and innovation.
v
EVs themselves may also hold the keys to fundamental change. 
To some, EVs may offer an entirely different value proposition from 
cars powered with internal combustion engines. Many consumers 
are willing to spend three times as much on their mobile phone bills 
as on their bills for land lines, and still, many give up land lines alto-
gether in favor of mobile phones. Do EVs look more like commodi-
ties or cell phones in this context? The answer may well be the latter. 
Moreover, EVs currently on the market are scarcely representa-
tive of EVs we will see even in 18 or 24 months. Change will happen 
fast—not unlike other high tech areas with early adopters standing 
in line to get a glimpse of the latest iPhone. EVs surely have some of 
these characteristics, which make them unique in the utilities space, 
where innovation usually doesn’t come with long customer lines.
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Utilities and regulators have a unique role to play in enabling 
EVs. On the one hand, EVs could become a true resource to the grid 
itself. EV battery technology is key to making micro-grids happen, 
which in themselves have large benefits ranging from grid stability 
to national security. There, utilities and their regulators can play 
the role of active enablers, encouraging customers to play just such 
a role.
Utility pricing models could also have an enormous impact, as the 
simple numeric example with on-peak and off-peak pricing shows. 
It doesn’t even need to go as far as real-time pricing. “Time of day” 
pricing may already be enough to bring about sufficient differences 
and, conversely, enable real cost savings for EV owners. In addition, 
utilities also need to be prepared—or possibly compelled—to pay 
customers real-time (or “time of day”) prices. In other words, if an 
EV gets charged during off-peak hours and is then able to sell elec-
tricity at peak demand times back to the grid, EV owners should be 
justly compensated and, in this case, be able to make money through 
their services.
v
Despite all the hype and justified excitement surrounding EVs, 
it’s also important to note that EVs are still cars. They are much bet-
ter cars, in many ways, but we may well save many more greenhouse 
gas emissions by looking at the entire transport landscape rather 
than a narrow focus on EVs or cars more broadly.





The entire electric system is undergoing dramatic changes. We 
are moving from a large-generator, one-way-grid, passive-customer 
model to something that is much more distributed on the generation 
side. Electric vehicles and battery technologies are one element in 
this equation. Renewables are another crucial component, possibly 
the most significant one of them all.
There are lots of uncertainties, but a few pieces are clear, espe-
cially on the policy side: Eventually, renewables need to stand on 
their own; we cannot continue to subsidize ad infinitum. However, 
it is equally clear that we cannot compare renewables to fossil fuels 
without adding in the social cost of carbon.
Another known and ever-present issue is intermittency. Wind 
doesn’t always blow, and the sun doesn’t always shine. That stands 
in contrast to other forms of electricity, which is indeed possible to 
dispatch almost whenever it is needed. Battery technology—possibly 
aided by EVs—will play a crucial role, but these additional storage 
services come at a cost, which need to be built into electricity prices.
Moreover, renewables come with environmental challenges of 
their own. The carbon impact of operation may be small or zero, 
but a rapid shift to renewables may still increase carbon emissions 
in the short-term due to the large investments necessary. Perhaps 
more important are some other environmental issues linked to 
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renewables, whether land-use changes or the need for precious met-
als—domestic or imported—as is the case for solar panels.
Still, the biggest challenge right now is cost, although the balance 
is changing rapidly. In 1980, wind cost 50 cents per kilowatt hour. 
Now it is 7 cents per kWh, and all signs point to a further halving of 
costs by 2020. Looking at these cost trends, it’s clear that renewables 
are still a very young industry, especially compared to traditional 
fossil fuels.
v
The true driver of renewables at current cost points is not technol-
ogy, it’s policy. One key element, of course, is carbon pricing to hold 
coal, natural gas, and oil accountable for their full environmental 
costs. We know that carbon pricing will come in one form or anoth-
er. Certainty around when and how that will happen will be crucial 
for a take-off of the renewable industry.
Failing that, a combination of other policies may well add up to 
appropriately sized incentives. Once again, though, policy certainty 
is paramount—for example an orderly and predictable scaling down 
of subsidies would be preferable to the current situation where pro-
duction credits for wind get extended on an annual basis and have 
frequently lapsed from year to year. When they do, new wind instal-
lations go down dramatically from one year to the next.
Regardless of the subsidy structure and other incentives, long-
term policy certainty has two elements: carbon pricing, and electrici-
ty pricing that reflects the true cost of supplies. Market manipulation 
is serious business—not necessarily manipulation by market partici-
pants, but rather by regulators in attempts to bring short-term prices 
down without adequately considering the long term. Market prices 
ought to reflect the true cost of generation as much as of demand 
response and other elements that can help renewables prosper and 
can help the grid provide stable supplies in the long term.
25
renewables
A smart grid—especially one driven by increased supplies of 
renewables—demands smart pricing structures that often have little 
to do with technology but much more with the regulator.
v
Another key element in this puzzle is transmission. It’s intimately 
related to renewables, mainly because many new renewable sources 
will require additional transmission lines to bring electricity to pop-
ulation centers. Current transmission payments are often inconsis-
tent with the beneficiary-pays principle. That leads to many a market 
distortion, especially when linked to renewables.
Some large-scale projects like the Atlantic Wind Connection are 
prime examples of projects that all but call for smart policy to be able 
to evaluate their overall efficacy and, ultimately, be able to imple-
ment them. Beneficiaries in this case are offshore wind providers, 
but also onshore customers, who would benefit from a strengthened 
grid overall.
Transmission planning, however, has formidable challenges in 
the current regulatory structure. State cooperation as well as federal 
participation are critical to any transmission plans and to fair cost 
allocation. All of that, of course, is often much easier said than done, 
and utilities often play a crucial role as well. Incumbent utilities 
don’t always see the benefits of supporting new transmission proj-
ects, which would more often than not aid new competitors. Still, 
a crucial step—possibly the most crucial one—is to find ways to 
monetize current transmission and distribution assets: How to find 
willing payers for transmission services? That’s a key question for 
utilities as well as for regulators. How else to get wind power from 
the Great Plains to places where more people actually live?  Or to get 
solar energy from deserts to the coasts?
v
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If renewables aren’t yet cost competitive and important challenges 
remain, what then drives current renewables investments? They can-
not be explained by long-term investment decisions or do-goodism 
alone. A driver—the key driver, in fact—is renewable mandates, 
primarily state-level Renewable Portfolio Standards that all but man-
date higher-cost renewables. Private capital is still remaining on the 
sidelines because renewables aren’t yet cost competitive, and there 
is no sustained policy driver. Instead, we see utilities that are all but 
obligated to invest to comply with state laws.
v
This focus on finances often misses what a true paradigm 
shift many renewables present. Fuel costs are no longer variable, 
but essentially zero. Operating cost uncertainty currently plays 
an important role in energy planning and purchasing behavior. 
Renewables may well be able to command a price premium simply 
by virtue of having no uncertainty regarding fuel cost. We already 
see many existing renewable plants at times bidding their services at 
close to or at zero. That poses real questions for transmission rights 
and related policy questions.
Another enormous paradigm shift is distributed generation. 
The central power-station model may well become a thing of the 
past. And distributed generation itself may trigger many more pol-
icy changes. Localized generation at the point of consumption will 
likely make more economic sense if it’s linked to demand response 
measures. The ultimate model may not be clear, but it’s clear that 
distribution pricing needs to change, largely driven by technological 
change in the renewable space.
In the end, one key question is whether the public will be willing 
to accept higher electricity rates. We need higher rates for reliable 
and clean service. So much is clear. The question is how far that 
rate increase can go, and how much will ultimately be attributed to 
cleaner, more reliable service as opposed to simply the fact that elec-
tricity has been underpriced for quite a while.
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Nuclear Power Post-Fukushima
Nuclear energy is a wedge issue, and it’s not necessarily a partisan 
divide. Almost every energy model that aims to meet most common-
ly stated greenhouse gas reduction targets assumes rapid deployment 
of new nuclear energy, a low-carbon fuel. That stands in stark con-
trast to some environmentalists’ vocal opposition to nuclear energy 
as the “ultimate non-renewable fuel.”
Nuclear energy defies easy categorization.
The Fukushima nuclear accident earlier this year only served to 
strengthen each position: Nuclear advocates point to it as proof that 
the dramatic problems that did ensue were avoidable and largely due 
to poor planning and poor regulatory oversight. Nuclear opponents, 
of course, had a much easier time justifying their renewed rage.
Chancellor Angela Merkel reacted by announcing a commitment 
to retire German nuclear plants within a decade. This was a reversal 
of her government’s previous position, although it was something 
Germany’s previous coalition government had already agreed.
The U.S. government, by contrast, reaffirmed its previously stated 
commitment to nuclear energy and announced that the Fukushima 
accident would change little other than a renewed assessment of 
Changing Currents: turbulenCe for the eleCtriCity industry?
 
28
safety in existing and planned plants. That is only good news for U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, although nuclear opponents predictably 
had a different reaction.
v
Currently, 104 plants are operating in the United States. They 
constitute around 10 percent of U.S. generation capacity but 
account for 20 percent of total generation, reflecting a remarkably 
high capacity factor throughout the fleet. Moreover, today 70 per-
cent of carbon-free electricity comes from nuclear power. That is a 
remarkable number and one that becomes increasingly important as 
old plants will retire as their licenses expire.
Existing nuclear plants, with their capital costs largely amortized 
and low operating costs, also show good financial performance, 
although that does not imply that new plants are coming online 
anytime soon. The so-called nuclear renaissance has largely missed 
the United States, with only four new plants currently under con-
struction.
Still, there are many issues and lessons to be learned both from 
Fukushima and from our experience with building and operating 
nuclear plants. Lack of standardization across the existing U.S. fleet 
is one clear issue, although some tensions remain between standard-
ized design and allowing learning from past experience.
Lots, of course, is still unknown. It took six years for anyone to 
see the inside of the Three Mile Island reactor. No one yet knows 
the extent of the damage in Fukushima. In any case, though, the 
impact of Fukushima on the design and construction of new reac-
tors in the United States will likely be small. First, we are building so 
few of them. More importantly, however, new plants are likely safer 
than the design used in Fukushima. There may be some impact on 
location decisions, but even that seems unlikely. September 11th 
prompted the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to require 
emergency equipment and other changes that cost licensees on the 
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order of $1 billion. Fukushima may lead to some changes to regula-
tions, but will likely lead to lesser overall costs than those incurred 
after September 11th.
The largest obstacle to building new nuclear plants in the United 
States is not safety or regulation, it is cost of constructing the plant in 
the first place—in part due to strict regulatory requirements. Loan 
guarantees offer the most substantial benefits to potential project 
developers. But it is difficult to see how nuclear energy can compete 
with new natural gas plants, given the current glut of natural gas.
v
One important trend in nuclear technology is toward smaller, 
more modular units. The lesson from the past 20 years—from newly 
built gas, solar, wind and other plants—is that smaller, more modu-
lar plants have certain advantages over large, central power stations. 
The same could hold for nuclear. Capital financing is much easier 
for smaller plans. Public perception might be much altered as well.
A big worry remains that although smaller, modular reactors 
may be easier to build and finance, some costs, such as security 
and emergency protection, may not scale with size. As a result, the 
advantages of small, modular reactors remain somewhat uncertain. 
The problem as with any new engineering systems is that we 
will need adjustments along the way. The first reactor will be a 
prototype. Later reactors will need to incorporate lessons from the 
prototype and other “demo” reactors. A big question is financing of 
the first units and especially research funding. In the current budget 
climate, it may be difficult to sustain a major effort in the United 
States.  The Chinese are a more likely candidate.
China will clearly play a central role in the global nuclear renais-
sance. While the United States is building four reactors, 50-60 new 
nuclear plants will be built in China by 2020! The worry there is that 
most of them have different designs—ranging from Generation II to 
IV. That also puts safety to the fore once again.
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China has no consistent nuclear regulatory program. Since its 
start in the 1980s, the regulatory regime moved from military to 
civilian oversight, and now several agencies are vying for the right 
to administer the program. The only true nuclear safety program 
is currently housed in one of the weakest ministries, the equivalent 
of the Environmental Protection Agency. The nuclear oversight 
program has scarcely 200 employees. That is a real worry, and the 
chance of implementing an effective independent nuclear agency in 
China are not good. That said, it’s clearly in everyone’s interest—
France, the United States, and especially the Chinese—for China to 




“Well, you can just stop and think of what could happen if any-
body with a decent system of government got control of that main-
land. Good God.”
President Richard Nixon’s infamous words about China still ring 
true today. Last year China became the biggest manufacturer, a posi-
tion the U.S. held for a century. In less than a decade, China will 
almost certainly become the largest economy.
China is experiencing huge shifts in demographics, urbanization, 
economics, electricity and general energy consumption. There’s no 
denying that major changes are under way.
In energy, the numbers speak for themselves: in 2000, China was 
half of U.S. consumption; in 2009, China overtook the United States 
as the number one consumer of energy. China will add generation 
equal to the entirety of current U.S. capacity in the next 15 years. 
China’s overall electricity demand is expected to triple from today’s 
levels by 2035. 
v
China also has its share of problems. Five strategic industries are 
driving 50 percent of China’s demand for energy, even though they 
only employ 15 million people, out of a total workforce of around 
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800 million. These numbers alone point to the importance of China 
growing its service sector and creating domestic demand for its 
products rather than relying on an export-led growth of its most 
prominent sectors.
Beijing has also recognized that energy demand increases point to 
real strains. China’s 11th five-year plan, from 2006 to 2010, included 
an ambitious target of decreasing energy intensity by 20%. China 
practically achieved the target, and reaffirmed a similar commit-
ment in its 12th five-year plan. But there is an even more ambitious 
target looming within the decade: generating 15 percent of electric-
ity from non-fossil sources by 2020. That translates into 230 to 480 
GW of non-fossil fuel capacity. Large hydro and nuclear help, but 
they are clearly not enough. Achieving this target will imply massive 
deployment of wind, solar, and other renewables including small 
hydro plants. To put this figure in perspective, even if China meets 
only half of its non-fossil target, China will constitute 50 percent of 
the global renewables market.
But even if China meets its entire target for non-fossil fuels, it still 
needs to add 450 GW of coal at minimum over the next decade. By 
2009, China was already a net importer of coal at a scale that com-
manded quantities equaling the totality of coal exports from the 
world’s two largest exporters, Australia and Indonesia.
How is China paying for its massive investments in industrial 
policy? In short, it’s happening on the backs of Chinese households, 
which have enormous savings rates but get little in return. Chinese 
state banks are offering 3 percent lending rates, while inflation is 
5.5 percent. That leads to perversities like the fact that Chinese per 
capita GDP is three times that of India, whereas per capita con-
sumption is only 30 percent above India. Households subsidize a 
banking system biased toward state-owned, heavy industry. That is 
a huge potential problem. China cannot get from $8,000 to $24,000 
per capita GDP on the backs of households alone, especially since 




Another crucial problem is that chairmen of the largest industrial 
firms hold ministerial ranks in Beijing, often above that of their own 
regulators. That is an important issue in nuclear safety and also for 
environmental and other regulations throughout many sectors of 
the economy.
v
China’s demand for coal will drive up global prices and will have 
massive implications for the United States. But China’s reach goes 
much farther. Government approval for new ventures might be 
bureaucratic, but the execution—speed and technology—is incred-
ibly fast. Adding the simple fact of China’s size and rate of growth 
to the equation means that China is taking a clear leadership role in 
the global energy and clean tech agenda.
The fact is clear: China will likely lock the United States out of the 
clean tech market within a decade.
China employs massive investments in industrial policy to domi-
nate markets. That makes the job of the United States all the more 
difficult. And we can never underestimate the impact of scaling. 
China, in effect, is building intellectual property in scaling up infra-
structure investments at an incredible rate. But the reach goes much 
beyond infrastructure markets. Electric vehicles, for example, are 
bound take off in China: first, because demand clearly exists, with 
a billion Chinese having never driven a car before; second, because 
China is increasingly investing in the technologies necessary to 
dominate the global EV market.
v
In general,  thinking that we can somehow “catch the Chinese” 
can only lead to U.S. policy blunders. As renewables scale globally, 
China will derive the most benefits. That much is clear. China is exe-
cuting a comprehensive manufacturing and incentive plan spanning 
energy generation, efficiency, and storage. It will likely be messy, but 
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Beijing will be achieving its goals in this area. That makes it all the 
more vital to keep open energy markets between the United States 
and China, to benefit from enormous Chinese growth in this area. 
The United States doesn’t have the ability to accelerate job creation 
domestically. Using Chinese investments and capital for job creation 
will be crucial in that respect.
The United States may not want to have an industrial policy simi-
lar to China’s policy of stimulating growth in renewables. Putting a 
price on carbon as environmental policy, however, may get us to a 
similar percentage of renewables, but without putting the burden 
exclusively on households as in the case of China. The reaction when 
the economy is bad is often to blame foreign threats, but that is the 
wrong instinct here. It’s a lack of appropriate domestic policy that is 
aiding China’s relative rise in some strategic industries.
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session i: Alternative Approaches to Climate Change
The failure of cap-and-trade legislation in the last Congress has turned 
political attention to other actions to mitigate climate change while meet-
ing the energy challenge. The Forum will discuss options such as enhanced 
energy RD&D, state and regional initiatives, EPA regulation, clean electric-
ity standards, carbon taxes in the context of deficit reduction, and the ben-
efits, costs and political likelihood of each. 
Chair — Phil Sharp, President, Resources for the Future
State and regional action: Vicki Arroyo, Executive Director,  
 Climate Center, Georgetown Law
RD&D and innovation: Richard Newell, Associate Professor  
 of Energy and Environmental  
 Economics, Duke University
Clean Electricity Standard Joseph Aldy, Assistant Professor,  
and EPA regulation: Harvard Kennedy School
Carbon tax: Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President,  
 American Action Forum
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session ii: Infrastructure Reliability and Adequacy
Discussions of energy security generally focus on oil, but continuing elec-
trification, aging infrastructure, and the possibility of rapid retirement of 
older coal plants raise equally important questions about the security, reli-
ability and adequacy of electricity infrastructure. This session will examine 
issues relating to enhancing and replacing generation and transmission 
facilities. 
Chair — Sue Tierney, Managing Principal, The Analysis Group
Reliability and security: Susan Eisenhower, President,  
 The Eisenhower Group
Challenges to replacing coal:   Nick Akins, President, AEP
The role of natural gas: Greg Staple, CEO, American Clean 
 Skies Foundation
Unconventional answers: Sue Tierney, Managing Principal,  




session iii: Electric Vehicles
The introduction of two mass market electric vehicles (EVs) has given 
greater immediacy to questions about electrification of the transporta-
tion sector. The Forum will consider utility business models necessary to 
support EVs, questions about deployment and customer acceptance, and 
prospects for improvements in energy storage technology. 
Chair — Phil Sharp, President, Resources for the Future
Utility business models John Russell, President and CEO,  
to support: CMS Energy
Utility business models Alex Kim, Director, Customer  
to support: Innovations, San Diego Gas &  
 Electric
Energy storage technology: Barbara Tyran, Director,  
 Washington & State Relations, EPRI 
Respondent: Ron Minsk, Senior Vice President,  
 Policy, Electrification Coalition






Increasing the use of renewable energy will require consideration of vari-
ous policy changes. What will be necessary to provide enhanced transmis-
sion capacity? What financial incentives, regulatory measures or market 
structures will be most effective? And what goals are reasonable given 
expected costs and technological advances? 
Chair — Michael Yackira, President and CEO, NVEnergy 
Transmission – Midwest: Gary Hanson, Commissioner, South 
 Dakota Public Utilities Commission 
Transmission – Atlantic offshore: Robert Mitchell, CEO, Trans-Elect
 
Obstacles and policy tools: Martha Wyrsch, President,  
 Vestas–American Wind Technologies
 
Market design factors: William Hogan, Professor of Global  
 Energy Policy, Harvard Kennedy  
 School
Costs and timing: Bryan Hannegan, VP for  





session V: Nuclear power post-Fukushima
Concern about climate change has helped reduce opposition to nuclear 
power, and the availability of federal loan guarantees has encouraged plans 
to build new reactors. The economics remain challenging, however, and 
public support is likely to decline as a result of the tragedy in Japan. What 
will determine the future of nuclear power in the United States? 
Chair — Richard Meserve, President, Carnegie Institution
The regulatory system: Richard Meserve, President,  
 Carnegie Institution
The decision to build: Cheri Collins, General Manager and 
 External Affairs Liaison, Nuclear  
 Operations and Development,  
 Southern Company
Financing nuclear reactors: James Asselstine, Managing Director, 
 Barclay’s Capital
The challenges: Peter Bradford, Adjunct Professor,  
 Vermont Law School; former  
 Commissioner, NRC
Next generation reactors: Michael Corradini, Chair,  
 Engineering Physics, University of  
 Wisconsin






China’s rapid electrification poses a host of questions for its own and 
global energy markets. Meeting the challenges may offer lessons for U.S. 
policies. This discussion will cover China’s actions on climate change miti-
gation, clean coal, renewables, and energy efficiency. 
Chair — Clint Vince, Chair, Energy, Transport & Infrastructure 
                  Practice, SNR Denton 
Overview: Trevor Houser, Partner, Rhodium  
 Group, LLC 
Clean coal: Jim Rogers, Chairman, President and 
  CEO, Duke Energy 
Renewables: Mike Splinter, Chairman, President  
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